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Conflict of Laws 
THOMAS F. LAMBERT, JR. 
This chapter concerns many subjects - subjects undoubtedly within 
the vested interests of the authors of other chapters of the SURVEY. 
However, the cases discussed here are peculiarly the concern of this 
chapter because they contain the element which makes them the do-
main of conflict of laws, namely, a "foreign" element - foreign in that 
something in the facts of the case forced the Supreme Judicial Court 
to recognize that it could not be concerned with the law of Massa-
chusetts alone. 
§12.1. Characterization and the Statute of Frauds. Lenn v. Riche l 
brought to the Court an interesting question relating to the character-
ization of substance and procedure and the Statute of Frauds. The 
plaintiff brought an action for breach of a bailment contract against 
the defendant, who had been appointed in Massachusetts the ancil-
lary administrator, with the will annexed, of the estate of one Bonn. 
Bonn, a resident of France, had died in 1941, leaving an estate in 
Massachusetts. 
Bonn was the uncle of the plaintiff and a man of considerable 
wealth and distinguished taste, with a fondness for his niece. In 1930 
in Germany he gave her a valuable painting and a number of Renais-
sance medallions, which she stored in a vault in Frankfurt. In 1935, 
apprehensive over the increasing N azification of German life, Bonn 
urged the plaintiff to send the painting to him in Paris, where he 
would display it in his apartment and safeguard it until she settled 
somewhere and wished its return. The plaintiff agreed to this and 
sent the painting to Bonn in Paris for display and safekeeping until 
such time as she requested its return. In 1940, following the bomb-
ing of Paris, it was agreed that Bonn would place the painting along 
with other valuables ;n a Paris bank, to be returned to the plaintiff 
"whenever she asked for it, whenever she arrived in the United 
States." 
About this time the plaintiff, being a German citizen, was impris-
oned in a concentration camp by the French, and when she was re-
leased, Paris was under the yoke of the German authorities. Bonn 
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had left the city. She never saw him again. She then made her way 
to the United States. 
There was evidence that Bonn did deposit the painting at the speci-
fied Paris bank. Being of Jewish extraction he had reason to take 
flight from Paris; he escaped to southern France, leaving the paint-
ing behind. Upon his death in 1941, he left a will, admitted to pro-
bate in France, in which he named his wife as his "universal legatee." 
In 1945, the plaintiff requested Bonn's widow to return her property, 
but without success. The present defendant married Bonn's widow, 
and the evidence as to what became of the plaintiff's painting after its 
deposit in the Paris bank would warrant the jury's inference that 
Bonn's widow and the defendant had failed to exercise care in its cus-
tody, were wrongfully withholding it, or had wrongfully disposed of 
it, "setting it afloat upon a sea of strangers." 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that since the painting had been 
delivered by the plaintiff to Bonn in Paris, French law controlled the 
substantive rights of the parties with respect to the bailment. The 
defendant, relying upon the fact that the bailment agreement was 
oral, invoked the French Statute of Frauds, which requires an instru-
ment to be notarized or made under private signature in any case 
where the matter involved exceeds 5000 francs. The parties stipu-
lated that the bailment agreement was oral and that the value of the 
plaintiff's painting exceeded 5000 francs. 
The Court accepted the apparent French characterization of the 
French statute as "substantive," and hence, presumably, applicable 
in bar of the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff, however, successfully in-
voked the doctrine of so-called "moral impossibility" in the French 
law under which the plaintiff is excused from the requirement of 
producing written evidence of the agreement if, for example, the re-
lationship between the parties is so intimate that it would be seriously 
embarrassing to ask for a written memorandum. Thus, the French 
Statute of Frauds with its escape clause of "moral impossibility" 
proved no insuperable barrier for the plaintiff. 
The defendant then argued that performance of Bonn's obligation 
as bailee to return the painting was excused by force majeure, under 
the familiar rule that excuse for nonperformance is governed by the 
lex loci solutionis.2 The Court ruled that the issue of force majeure 
was for the jury, which had found against the defendant on the issue. 
The defendant, who, as stated, had married Bonn's widow, gave 
exculpatory evidence of his diligent efforts to ship the painting from 
the Paris bank southward across the occupation and demarcation line 
to Marseilles and sanctuary. He suggested that the Nazi authorities 
had pillaged the painting in course of transit. But this was all for 
the jury, and the jury disbelieved. 
The absorbing problem of characterization or qualification can 
• Louis-Dreyfus v. Paterson Steamships Ltd., 43 F.2d 824, 72 A.L.R. 242 (2d Cir. 
1930). 
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§12.1 CONFLICT OF LAWS 103 
be encountered more than once in the consecutive stages of a conflicts 
ca~e. The first is conventionally called "primary characterization," 
and obliges the judge in the forum to characterize the issue or ques-
tion before him. For example, is a suit by a passenger against a com-
mon carrier an issue of tort or contract liability? Does a widow's 
claim give rise to a question of marital property rights or to one in the 
administration of estates? Does the nonconsent of a parent to his 
minor child's marriage present a question of formalities of the mar-
riage ceremony or go to the capacity of the party to enter into the 
marriage? And so, by analogy, the issue in the Lenn case might be 
phrased, does the plea of the Statute of Frauds raise a question of pro-
cedure, to be referred to the lex fori, or one of substance, for the lex 
loci? The pat rule on primary characterization is that it is for the 
forum. 
The second stage in a conflicts case involves defining the connecting 
factor, such as "domicile," "place of contracting," "center of gravity of 
the contract," or "place of performance." The conventional rule is 
that the connecting factor is defined by the lex fori. Such a charac-
terization may be merely provisional and tentative, however, subject 
to a controlling characterization by the lex loci in the interest of 
uniformity. This suggestion looks forward to the fourth stage and 
raises the question of whether the forum will use the renvoi, i.e., the 
foreign state's conflicts rule, when that rule and the forum's differ la-
tently as well as patently. 
The third stage involves the delimitation of the lex causae, i.e., 
the law selected by the forum's conflicts rule to govern the substan-
tive rights of the parties. In the instant case the lex causae was, of 
course, French law, because the Massachusetts Court concluded that 
the issue (primary characterization) was liability for breach of the 
bailment contract, to be referred to the place of bailment, France. 
But how much of the lex loci, French law, was to be used? Not the 
French rules on the scope of cross-examination, the number of return 
days on a writ, whether the suit is in law or in equity, or the method 
of serving process. In other words, only French substantive law was 
to be used, not French rules of procedure. This leads to the critical 
question in the Lenn case: Do you label the French Statute of 
Frauds as substantive or procedural by the lex fori, do you accept 
the French label, or do you label it by the lex fori after studying its 
operative features in the context of the French conflict of laws? This 
question was not explicitly raised, referred to, or analyzed in the Lenn 
case. 
The fourth stage, as has been mentioned, lies in determining 
whether the forum's reference to the lex loci involves a reference to 
just the internal, domestic rule of law on the one hand, or to the 
entire law of the locus on the other. 
It is obvious that if you treat the issue of the Statute of Frauds as a 
question of primary characterization to be decided by the forum, you 
maximize uncertainty and lack of uniformity in the conflict of laws. 
3
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Sound policy calls for minimizing the role of the forum in cases con-
taining foreign elements. 
On the other hand, if you refer characterization of the Statute of 
Frauds issue to the lex loci, you encounter a paradox, for if the locus 
characterizes the issue as one of procedure and the forum accepts that 
label, that means each state, forum and locus, will apply its own stat-
ute, sacrificing uniformity. 1£ each state is allowed to characterize its 
own statute by its own rule, you have the possibility of a gap (forum 
calls it substantive, locus calls it procedural) or an overlap (forum 
calls it procedural, locus calls it substantive). 1£ you approach the 
problem in terms of the objectives of the conflict of laws, then either 
the substantive characterization or the rule of alternative reference 
may be preferable. 1£ all states would agree to treat the issue as one of 
substance, as Massachusetts apparently did in the Lenn case, then re-
gardless of where suit was brought, the reference would be to the 
law of the locus, and uniformity of result would be achieved thereby,S 
irrespective of the forum. On the other hand, as in formalities gener-
ally, there is much to be said for a rule of alternative reference in the 
interest of sustaining commercial transactions wherever conscien-
tiously possible, i.e., using the statute of the forum or the locus, 
whichever upholds the contract. Ut res magis vale at quam pereat. 
The entire problem of characterization may appear to be esoteric 
or wayward, but it is implicit not only in every conflicts case, but in all 
verbal thinking. It is the law's response to the fact that terms and 
concepts in the conflicts rules of different countries are differently de-
fined. Massachusetts and France may both agree that procedure is for 
the forum and substantive rights in a bailment case are for the place 
of bailment. But what if one defines the Statute of Frauds to be a 
question of procedure and the other, a question of substance? Uni-
formity perishes. 
The Court is to be commended for using the Statute of Frauds of the 
locus, France, in the Lenn case, for such a characterization tends to 
promote uniformity of result regardless of the form selected.4 
§12.2. Foreign land and the Statute of Frauds. In Herman v. 
Edingtonl the Court had occasion to reassert the distinction between 
jurisdiction and choice of law in a case in which the plaintiff sought in 
the Massachusetts forum to impress a trust on Florida land or on the 
proceeds from a wrongful sale of this foreign land. 
The decedent had lived meretriciously for several years with the 
plaintiff. He gave her an envelope containing deeds representing his 
title to two lots of Florida real estate, and wrote thereon that the 
property, though still retained in his name, was now the property of 
the plaintiff in repayment of loans advanced by her. Having ini-
8 Louis v. F. H. Smith Co., 36 Del. 477,178 Atl. 651, 105 A.L.R. 646 (1935). 
• Compare the earlier Massachusetts case of Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass. 325 
(1875). 
§12.2. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 337, 118 N.E.2d 865. 
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§12.2 CONFLICT OF LAWS 105 
tialed and dated the legend, the decedent delivered the envelope to 
the plaintiff. The decedent, who died testate domiciled in Massachu-
setts, left his property to those entitled to receive it under Massachu-
setts laws of descent and distribution. One defendant, the adopted 
son of the decedent, met the plaintiff for the first time after his father's 
death. The plaintiff gave him the envelope containing the deeds, 
and he promised to have the title transferred to her. Instead of doing 
so, he engaged in stalling tactics and eventually refused to recognize 
that the plaintiff had any interest in the land. The son then got title 
through ancillary administration in Florida, and sold the two lots for 
$9500, $7000 of which he gave to his wife, the other defendant. The 
plaintiff then brought suit against the defendants, seeking to impress 
the proceeds of the sale of the Florida real estate with a trust in her 
favor. The critical issue, therefore, was whether at the time of the 
decedent's death the Florida lots were impressed with a trust in the 
plaintiff's favor. 
Before reaching that question, however, the Court had to determine 
the threshold issue: whether the Massachusetts Court had jurisdiction 
to determine the plaintiff's interest in land located in another state. 
The Court, following settled principles of the conflict of laws, held 
that it had jurisdiction in the plaintiff's suit. All the plaintiff sought 
was a decree in personam against the defendants, ordering them to 
pay her a sum representing the proceeds of the wrongful sale of the 
two Florida lots by the son. She did not seek a decree operating di-
rectly on the Florida realty. The decedent had been domiciled in 
this Commonwealth during the entire period of his association with 
the plaintiff, including the period when he dealt with the plaintiff rela-
tive to the land, and at the time he died. He directed in his will that 
his estate should be administered according to the law of this Com-
monwealth. All parties in interest were before the Court. Both de-
fendants were domiciled here, where they could be given their day 
in court. If the son had not sold the Florida property but had still 
retained title at the time of the plaintiff's suit, it is clear that since 
the Massachusetts Court had personal jurisdiction over the defendants, 
it could have ordered them to convey the land to the plaintiff. It is 
conventionally held that a court may exercise jurisdiction in personam 
to affect matters outside the state. The orthodox illustration is where 
a defendant personally before the court is ordered to convey foreign 
land.2 In the Herman case, the Court said, conformably to the weight 
of authority, that it had jurisdiction to order the defendants to con-
vey the Florida property to the plaintiff, or, since the lots had been 
sold, to account to her for the proceeds. 
The second fundamental issue faced by the Court was what law de-
termined whether the plaintiff had acquired an equitable interest in 
the Florida land. Again following the weight of authority, the Court 
held that this question was to be decided according to the law of the 
• Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 217 (3d ed. 1949). 
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situs, Florida. The general rule that the law of the situs governs the 
creation of interests in land applies to equitable as well as legal in-
terests, since under the doctrine of efficacy the exclusive control of the 
sovereign at the situs embraces equitable as well as legal interests in 
the land. Whether claimants work out their rights through the sheriff 
or the chancellor is ultimately a matter of procedure.3 Our Court ac-
cordingly referred the issue whether the plaintiff had acquired an 
equitable interest in the decedent's Florida lands to the lex rei sitae, 
holding that a trust so created by the lex loci would be recognized at 
the forum, Massachusetts. The Court then ascertained that, under 
the law of Florida, the decedent's Florida lands were impressed at his 
death with a trust in the plaintiff's favor. 
The final question was whether on the facts of the case the require-
ments of the Statute of Frauds were satisfied. The Court held on this 
issue that the delivery of the envelope with the written statements 
thereon and the deeds therein, in the light of the attending circum-
stances, satisfied the Statute of Frauds and showed that the decedent 
intended to make himself trustee of the lands for the plaintiff's benefit. 
The Court apparently concluded that both the Florida and Massachu-
setts Statutes of Frauds were satisfied. This enabled the Court to 
avoid an explicit decision on the controversial question of whether the 
Statute of Frauds embodies a rule of substance or procedure. It does 
not appear clear from the opinion of the Court where the agreement 
involving the delivery of the envelope with the legend thereon was 
entered into by the plaintiff and the decedent. At the time of the 
agreement, the decedent was domiciled in Massachusetts, and the 
plaintiff, apparently, in New York. Suppose that the agreement be-
tween the plaintiff and the decedent had been made in Florida, and 
that the suit in equity had been brought by the plaintiff in Massachu-
setts, and that the memoranda in the case satisfied the Statute of 
Frauds of one state but not the other. Unless Massachusetts adopted 
a rule of alternative reference in the interests of the security of trans-
actions, upholding the declaration of trust if it satisfied the statute of 
either state, it would then be critical whether Massachusetts character-
ized the issue of the Statute of Frauds as substantive, to be referred to 
the place of contracting or possibly the situs of the land, or pro-
cedural, to be referred to the forum. Many commentators say that 
the preferable view is to regard the issue as a matter of substance and 
to recognize an agreement br declaration as valid which complies with 
the law of the state where it was made. In the Herman case, as-
suming that the declaration of trust occurred in either Florida or Mas-
sachusetts, the finding that the Statutes of Frauds of both states 
were satisfied enabled the Court to sidestep or defer a definitive ruling 
upon the vexing question of whether the statute is to be characterized 
as presenting an issue of substance or of procedure. 
• Beale, Equitable Interests in Foreign Property, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 382 (1907). 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1954 [1954], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1954/iss1/18
§12.3 CONFLICT OF LAWS 107 
§12.3. The domicile of minor children. In the interesting case of 
State Tax Commission v. Felt? while all parties concerned were dom-
iciled in the Commonwealth, a mother made a declaration of trust 
for the benefit of her minor children. Four years later, in 1946, the 
mother was validly divorced from the father, and the decree awarded 
her custody of the minor children. A year later, while still domiciled 
in the Commonwealth, she married her second husband, who was 
domiciled then and at all material times in Toronto, Canada. In 
June, 1947, the wife moved to her new husband's home, and in Sep-
tember, 1947, after attending summer camps in New England, the 
children, with the consent of their father, went to Toronto to live 
with their mother and stepfather and there they remained. 
The nub of the controversy was whether the income from the trust 
payable to the children during the year 1950 was subject to tax in 
Massachusetts. Under orthodox rules relating to jurisdiction to tax, if 
the children were not domiciled in the Commonwealth during 1950 
the trust income then payable to them was immune to tax liability.2 
The essential question, therefore, primae impressionis in the Com-
monwealth, was as phrased by the Court: "If a mother is awarded cus· 
tody of minor children by a valid decree of divorce entered in this 
Commonwealth, where the parents and children were domiciled, and 
she by remarriage acquires a domicil in another jurisdiction, to which 
~ she takes the children with the consent of the father, does the domicil 
of the children follow that of the mother?" 3 
The Court, in a carefully reasoned, realistic, and progressive opin· 
ion, answered the question in the affirmative and therefore concluded 
that the income payable to the children was not taxable in Massachu-
setts. 
It is settled that a minor child's domicile, in the case of separation 
or divorce of his parents, is that of the parent to whose custody he has 
been legally given. At the time the divorce decree was issued, the 
wife retained her domicile in Massachusetts, the domicile of the chil-
dren remaining with her. Upon her subsequent remarriage, she took 
the domicile of her second husband, thereby acquiring a domicile by 
operation of law in Canada. But the children did not automatically 
become members of the stepfather's family. He did not, for example, 
legally adopt them. Clearly, then, the children's domicile did not fol-
low that of the stepfather by operation of law although the mother's 
did. N or would their domiciles change by reason solely of a change 
in the domicile of the stepfather. Still, if the children actually move 
to the mother's new home and there live with her, should not the 
mother have the power to change the domicile of the children to her 
new location? Otherwise phrased, where a child actually moves to 
§12.3. "1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 67, 117 N.E.2d 166. 
2 C.L., c. 62, §8, particularly (<I); id. §IO, first sentence. 
3 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 67, 117 N .E.2d 166. See Beale, The Conflict of Laws, 
1886-1936,50 Harv. L. Rev. 887, 891 (1937). 
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his mother's new domicile and she there establishes a home for him, 
then does not the child's domicile follow to the new domicile of the 
mother, or does the child retain during the rest of his minority the 
premarital domicile of his mother, in this case, Massachusetts? 4 The 
older authorities generally agreed that a mother, no longer being 
sui juris, could not change the domicile of her child. Being herself a 
dependent person and taking derivatively the domicile of her new 
husband, she was powerless to change her child's domicile. Under 
this view a child would retain his mother's antenuptial domicile, 
even though he were living in her new home, until such time as he 
attained a capacity for acquiring a domicile of choice or his domicile 
was otherwise changed. This reasoning has lost much, if not all, of its 
force today.5 It artificially divorces domicile in law from residence in 
fact, and it is manifestly desirable to avoid a spread between the facts 
of residence and the concept of domicile. The admirable feature of 
the present case is that the Supreme Judicial Court declined to follow 
the older and discredited view that a mother upon remarriage could 
not change the domicile of her child. In a sound opinion reflecting the 
increasing emancipation of women, the Court has held that, at least 
where a child, whose legal custody has been awarded to the mother, 
actually moves to the mother's new home, then the child's domicile 
follows that of the mother upon the mother's remarriage. This posi-
tion is supported by the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.6 
It might be added that, since in the Felt case the children's father was 
personally subject to the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts divorce 
court, the decree awarding custody of the minor children to the libel-
lant-wife effectively adjudicated the rights of the parties to the custody 
of the children. In the absence of changed circumstances sister states 
would be bound by the full faith and credit clause to recognize the 
custody portions of the Massachusetts decree. While the principle of 
"divisible divorce" is apparently now to be applied to custody decrees, 
it operates only in the case of ex parte decrees, where personal juris-
diction over the defendant parent is lacking. Where, as in the Felt case, 
the defendant-parent is domiciled in the divorce forum or is there 
served with process or personally appears and participates in the pro-
ceedings of the divorce court, the decree will effectively divest him of 
his rights to custody of the children of the marriage. 
The instant case also tends to support the notion that the meaning 
of the term "domicile" varies, within limits, with the nature of the 
problem at hand. The context and circumstances of the particular 
case in which a definition of the term is sought should be kept in 
mind. While there doubtless is a hard core to the notion of domicile, 
consisting of physical presence and intent to remain, there are fringe 
differences which become critical when one considers what the intent 
is and how long the presence continues. In the Felt case, it was 
• Lamar v. Micou, 112 U.S. 452, 5 Sup. Ct. 221, 28 L. Ed. 751 (1884). 
6 Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 89 (3d ed. 1949). 
• §38, Comment d (1934). 
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necessary to determine the domicile of the minor children in order to 
decide whether their income from a trust fund was taxable. Income 
taxation suggests a retrospective significance to the concept of domicile 
in terms of protection rendered and benefits afforded by the taxing 
state. When it is remembered that during 1950, both the minor chil-
dren, as beneficiaries, and the parent to whom their custody had been 
awarded, were living in Toronto, Ontario, enjoying the protection 
of the Canadian laws, the Court's conclusion that the domicile of the 
children followed that of their mother to Canada seems eminently 
sensible. Clearly the children were residing in Canada during the 
taxable year, and the decision achieves an admirable result in narrow-
ing the spread between residence in fact and domicile in law. 
§12.4. Foreign corporations: Internal management. Beacon Wool 
Corp. v. Johnson! involved a bill in equity by a foreign corporation 
to compel two defendant directors to restore to the corporation sums 
paid by the directors to employees and to themselves. As disclosed by 
the evidence the corporation was a "one·man company" whose poli-
cies were dictated by its president and sole stockholder. After his 
death, the defendants continued to pay profit-sharing bonuses to em-
ployees and to themselves pursuant to a resolution which had been 
passed during the president's life. The Court accepted the judge's 
finding that the resolution did not contemplate such payments if the 
president died, especially where the corporation'S financial outlook 
was bad. The Court affirmed the trial court's decree that under the 
applicable law of the charter state, Delaware, the defendants were 
liable to the corporation for amounts paid to the employees and them-
selves. 
The conflicts question presented was: What law determines the lia-
bility of directors of a foreign corporation paying assertedly illegal 
bonuses to employees and to themselves? As stated, the corporation 
was incorporated in Delaware and was apparently a tramp corporation 
doing the bulk of its wool brokerage business in Massachusetts. The 
Court followed the weight of authority in holding that the liability of 
the defendants for their acts as directors was controlled by the law of 
I the state of incorporation, Delaware. Under the internal law of that 
1 state, the Court found that the payments made by the defendan'ts were 
I "constructively fraudulent" and illegal. 
! A preliminary question in this case might have been: Will the trial 
I court even take jurisdiction of the bill against the delinquent directors i of a foreign corporation? The usual rule is that a court will not 
i entertain suits against a foreign corporation or its directors or officers 
.\ if the controversy concerns only the internal management or affairs 
.. of the corporation.2 Considerations of convenience normally require 
that such suits be brought in the courts of the charter state. If, how-
,) 
§12.4. ] 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 411, 119 N.E.2d 195. 
2 Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 288 U.S. 123, 53 Sup. Ct. 295, 77 L. 
Ed. (i>2, S9 A.L.R. 720. 73fi (193'1): Restatement. Conflict of Laws ~195 (1934). 
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ever, suit is brought at the corporation's principal place of business, 
at what has been termed the "commercial domicile," and there is 
nothing to indicate that defense of the action would involve undue 
hardship or inconvenience, the court may assume jurisdiction.3 In 
the Beacon Wool case, as stated, Massachusetts was apparently the 
commercial center of the corporation's business activities. 
It would seem, however, that Massachusetts, as the corporation's 
principal place of business, would be allowed to fix the standards for 
bonus payments by directors to local employees and to themselves. 
Such payments, of course, might prejudice the interests of local cred-
itors, and Massachusetts would have an interest in policing and pro-
tecting the locally conducted portion of the affairs of the foreign cor-
poration, including dividend- and bonus-paying policies. Why should 
Delaware, technical domicile of a tramp corporation, be accorded 
suzerainty over the possibly multistate activities of such a corporation? 
On the other hand, if each state wherein the foreign corporation does 
a substantial amount of business may apply its own law of dividends, 
bonus payments, and ultra vires acts, the absence of constitutional 
review and inhibition could result in an overlay of friction, incon-
sistency, and contradiction, calling, conceivably, for the corrective of 
the full faith and credit clause.4 
§12.5. Pennoyer v. Neff and problems of jurisdiction. In Katz v. 
Katz! the Court had occasion to revisit and re-examine the celebrated 
case of Pennoyer v. NefJ.2 The Katz case concerned a petition 
brought by a wife against her nonresident husband containing the 
usual allegations of failure by the husband, without just cause, to fur-
nish suitable support, and praying for such order as the court deemed 
expedient concerning the wife's support. A writ was issued to attach 
certain funds of the husband in designated banks and trust companies. 
It did not appear from the record, however, how much property of 
the nonresident husband had been caught by the attachment of funds 
in the banks upon which service was made. The Probate Court en-
tered a decree favorable to the wife, part of which ordered the hus-
band to pay fifty dollars a week for the support of the wife until the 
further order of the court. The husband appealed. The Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the trial judge was warranted in finding that 
the husband had deserted the wife and was now living in Indiana. 
Since the wife was living apart from the husband for justifiable cause, 
she had a capacity to retain a separate domicile in the Common-
• Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. Co., 326 U.S. 549, 66 Sup. Ct. 284,90 L. Ed. 311 
(1946). 
• Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 63 Sup. Ct. 602, 87 L. Ed. 1772 
(1943); International Ticket Scale Corp. v. United States, 165 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1948); 
German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl, 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915). See espe-
cially Freund, "Review and Federalism," Supreme Court and Supreme Law 107 
(Cahn ed. 1954). 
§12.5. '330 Mass. 635, 116 N.E.2d 273 (1953). 
295 U.S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878). 
10








§12.6 CONFLICT OF LAWS III 
wealth, and the Massachusetts courts, therefore, had jurisdiction to 
decree her separate support. 
The Court then came face to face with the landmark case of Pen-
noyer v. Neff. Under the rule in that case the judgment forum does 
not have jurisdiction to enter a decree in personam for the payment of 
money against a nonresident not personally served therein. More pre-
cisely, Pennoyer held that where a personal judgment is given without 
jurisdiction over the defendant, and execution thereafter is levied on 
his land, no title passes to the transferee; the judgment is void under 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The presence 
of the defendant's property in the state of rendition does not validate 
the personal judgment. In the Pennoyer case, although the Court 
laid stress on the failure to seize or attach any property at the com-
mencement of the action, the real vice was that the judgment sought 
and given was a judgment in personam, and this void judgment was 
not revitalized by the later discovery and seizure of property of the de-
fendant. Since that part of the decree in the Katz case which required 
payment of money by the husband to the wife appeared to the Massa-
chusetts court to be an in personam decree, the Court properly held 
that the Probate Court was powerless to enter it. This is simply a re-
affirmation of the Pennoyer rationale that a court is constitutionally 
powerless to enter a personal judgment against a nonresident defend-
ant not served within the state of rendition. 
However, it was conceded that in the exercise of its quasi in rem 
jurisdiction, the Probate Court had power to enter a support decree 
against a nonresident husband provided his property in the Common-
wealth had been attached. The husband, of course, could be made to 
respond to the satisfaction of such a decree only to the extent of the 
amount and value of such property. Since it did not appear from the 
record how much property had been caught by attachment served on 
the banks, the Supreme Judicial Court remanded the cause to deter-
mine the amount of the husband's funds actually caught. Consistent 
with the requirements of quasi in rem jurisdiction, the decree order-
ing the husband to pay a weekly sum to the wife would be modified to 
provide that only property caught by the attachment could be applied 
to the periodic support payments. 
§12.6. The powers of foreign testamentary trustees. Assessors of 
Everett v. Albert N. Parlin House, Inc.,1 brought to the Court a pro-
ceeding by a corporate charity to obtain an abatement of a realty tax. 
Pursuant to the will of a New Hampshire testator, the court of that 
state appointed certain executors and trustees who were directed by 
the will to buy or build a lodging house in or near the city of Boston 
for certain designated charitable purposes. The trustees bought two 
lots in Everett and caused a modern brick building to be erected for 
carrying out the specified charitable objects in the will. Thereafter 
the trustees caused a corporation to be organized under the laws of the 
§12.6. 11954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 389, 118 N.E.2d 861. 
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Commonwealth to execute the indicated charitable purposes, and to 
that end transferred to the corporation by trustees' deeds the two par-
cels of Everett realty. The board of assessors of Everett assessed a real 
estate tax for 1950 and 1951 upon the two lots. The Appellate Tax 
Board granted abatements, and the board appealed. 
It is a familiar premise that in order to be entitled to an exemption 
the charitable institution must not only occupy the premises but it 
must be the owner. From the standpoint of the conflict of laws the 
principal contention of the assessors was that the corporation did not 
own the property. They contended that the authority of the trustees 
appointed by the New Hampshire court to act in a representative ca-
pacity ended at the state line. Since the authority of the trustees did 
not extend beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the New Hampshire 
court, it followed that the corporation did not acquire any title what-
ever. The crux of the argument for the assessors was that, generally, 
except when permitted by a statute of the situs, here Massachusetts, 
foreign trustees have no authority to convey realty in another state. 
In the instant case the trustees appointed by the New Hampshire 
court had failed to get the prior authorization of the Probate Court in 
Massachusetts for the transfer of the realty to the locally formed cor-
poration. In view of the failure of the testamentary trustees to secure 
a license to convey the lots to the corporation, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the corporation failed to sustain the burden of proof 
relating to the ownership of the realty. Accordingly, there was error 
in granting an abatement of the tax on the realty. 
This case is a melancholy example of the background rule that 
when a fiduciary is appointed by judicial action in one state, his au-
thority to act ends at the borders of the appointing state.2 Many a 
shipwrecked financial operation bears testimony to the inconvenience 
of the rule. It is to the interest of local landowners that the legisla-
ture enact a statute extending the extraterritorial land capacity of 
a foreign fiduciary. Massachusetts has passed such a statute which, 
broadly speaking, allows the foreign fiduciary to resort to local proce-
dures for the sale, mortgage, or leasing of local land.3 Great as are 
the statutory inroads on the traditional background rule, the instant 
case shows how vital it is, when problems arise as to the extraterrito-
rial land capacity of a foreign fiduciary, to make careful search and 
compliance with local statutory provisions. For want of such compli-
ance, a tax abatement was lost in the instant case. 
21 Powell, Real Property 595 et seq. (1949). 
• C.L., c. 201, §30; id. c. 202, §§32, 33. 
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